Lloyd E. Lish, Jr. v. Utah Power & Light Company, A Maine Corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971
Lloyd E. Lish, Jr. v. Utah Power & Light Company,
A Maine Corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker; Attorneys for Defendant-AppellantCarmen E. Kipp and J. Anthony
Eyre; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lish v. Utah Power & Light, No. 12474 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3140
THE SUPREME COURT 
F THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. USH, JR., 
Pltzimiff-ResfJ°""""', 
vs. 
POWER &: LIGHT 
ANY, a Maine corporation, 
Defntlt1nl·A~. 
0-No. 
12474 
<' . ' ' 
. l ~ ,. ·~ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE---------··········-·····-······ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT -------·····--·········-···· 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -----------------------·-·-·---··············- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------···-·······-----·---------·-·············· 2
ARGUMENT -------------------------·····-····--------·-----···-·······---------·-----·-····· 6
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT 6 
POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY ........ 7 
POINT III. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE CORRECT AND DID NOT RESULT 
IN ANY PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT -·········----------·· 14 
POINT IV. 
THE SUM OF $13,675.56 AWARDED BY THE JURY 
AS SPECIAL DAMAGES SHOULD BE ADDED TO 
THE JUDGMENT __________________ -----------------------------------------· 24 
CONCLUSION ____ ........ _______________ . ------------------------------------· 26 
CASES CITED 
Black v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, 
56 N.J. 63, 265 A.2d 129 ------------------------------------------------------ 23 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association, 
24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 ---------------------------------------- 14, 15 
Burton v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 
122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 ------------------------------------------------ 6 
Campbell, v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
15 Utah 2d, 113, 380 P.2d 409 -------------------------------------------- 11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 ----------------··--·-· .. 
Cope v. Davidson, 30 Ed. 193, 180 p. 873 --------------------------···--· 17 
Cromeenes v. San Pedro L. A. & Salt Lake Railroad Company, 
37 Utah 475, 109 Pac. 10 --··-----·--·--·--------·----------------------·-·-··· 10 
Elliot!t v. Black River Electric Co-op, 
233 S.C. 273, 104 S.E. 2d 357 ----------------------------------·--- ... _ 2l 
Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 230 P.2d 576 ----------···--· 19 
Glen v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 
1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013 ---------·----------------------·-··---····-·· 
Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 __________ _ 
Grant v. Pelton, 16 Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d 897 --·----------------·-·-··-·· 
Hale v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 
192 F.2d 274 (C.A. 8, S.D.) ···-------------------------------------··----···· 1l 
Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 --------·---·-···- 19. 
Hendersen v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 
184 Kan. 691, 239 P.2d 702 --·-------------------------------------------·· 2l 
Hindmarsh v. 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 
21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 --------·---------------------·----------· 8, 11 
Ireland v. Mitchell, 359 P.2d 894 (Ore. '61) -·--------------------·----- 17 ' 
Jensen v. Dolan, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 ---·-------·-----------· 9 : 
Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676 -------------------·----·-·-·· 9 · 
Nagle v. Club Fontainblue, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346 .... 6 . 
Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 
17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 ------------------·--------------------------- .. 
Potter v. SAC-Osage Electric Cooperative, Inc., 
335 S.W. 2d 192 (Mo. '60) ---·----·-----------·-----------------------·-·--· lJ · 
State By and Through Road Commission v. Kendell, ii. 
20 Utah 2d 356, 438 P.2d 178 ---------------------------------·----·-·- -·· 
Sumsion v. General Motors Corporation, 
24 Utah 2d 301, 450 P.2d 399 -------·--------------------------------··-· 
Whitehead v. Adair, 10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d 956 ------------·-
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 26, 
Electricity, Gas & Steam, Section 122 -------------------------------- 21 
American Jurisprudence, Section 53, Trial Section 552 ________ 16 
American Law Reports 2d, Volume 69, Section 9 -------------------- 12 
American Law Reports 2d, Volume 60 ____ ------------------------------- 13 
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 81, 
Section 234 C. (b) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(g) -------------------------------- 25 
I 
IN THE SUPREME C01UR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD E. LISH, JR., 
Plaintiff· Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT 
COMP ANY, a Maine corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12474 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff when a metal probe which he was holding 
in his hands came in contact with the defendant's high 
voltage electric power line. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Calvin 
Gould, sitting with a jury. The jury returned a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the trial 
court affirmed and for an order reforming the judgment 
to add the sum of $13,675.56 which was awarded by the 
verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident giving rise to this case occurred on the 
morning of February 28, 1969, at a grain bin owned by 
Willard R. Smith, Jr. in Holbrook, Idaho. (R. 1, T. 93, 
262) The plaintiff had gone to the grain bin to obtain 
samples of the grain in connection with his occupation as 
a grain buyer. (T. 93) 
The grain bin owned by Mr. Smith was located im-
mediately adjacent to the south side of a highway which 
runs in an east-west direction. The high voltage power 
line owned by defendant was also located on the south ' 
side of the highway. (T. 10; See diagram of scene attach· 
ed as an exhibit to R. 16) The grain bin has perma· 
nently affixed ladder rungs on the north side which is 
closest to the defendant's power line and was constructed 
in 1946 sometime prior to the time the power line was 
constructed. (T. 263, 264) At the time it was originally 
constructed, the defendant's power line consisted of one 
energized and one neutral line, both of which were placed 
on poles which were erected without cross-arms. Ap· 
proximately a year or two prior to the accident, the defend· 
ant modified its power line by adding cross-arms to the 
poles. This remodeling had the effect of moving the near· 
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est energized line approximately four feet closer to the 
grain bin. (T. 301) 
At the time of the accident, the nearest energized 
wire was 9.01 feet from the grain bin according to the 
plaintiff's expert and 9.77 feet from the bin according to 
defendant's expert which measurements were both made 
by surveying devices. (T. 10, 285) The defendant's 
power line consisted of three energized wires and one 
neutral wire with the voltage being 12,500 from one line 
to another and 7,200 from each line to ground. (T. 298) 
The plaintiff arrived at the grain bin and took three 
or four three foot sections of a probe with him and climb-
ed up the ladder rungs and into the grain bin through the 
hole in the top. (T. 96) Plaintiff assembled the sections 
of the probe after he was inside of the grain bin and then 
obtained the grain samples by inserting the probe down 
into the grain and retracting the same. He then started 
to climb out of the bin by the hole at the top with the 
probe still assembled. Plaintiff had kept the probe in an 
assembled condition because he was going to probe a 
nearby grain bin and at this length it would fit easily into 
the pickup truck which he was driving. (T. 98, 99) As 
plaintiff was sitting on the grain bin with one foot in 
and one foot out of the entrance hole and in the process 
of removing the probe from the bin, it came in contact 
with the defendant's power line, which resulted in severe 
and permanently disabling injuries to plaintiff. (T. 100) 
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Plaintiff had travelled the road adjacent to the 
power line on other occasions and was aware of the poles 
which he described as "telephone poles" but stated he was . 
I 
not fully aware that this was an electric power line. 
(T. 175, 176) Plaintiff further testified that he did not 
1 
observe the power lines when coming out of the bin and 
that he thinks he could tell a high voltage electrical wire ' 
from a telephone wire because the high voltage electric 1 
wire may be insulated. (T. 189, 191) However, the 1 
power lines involved in the accident were not insulated. 
(T. 238, 239) 
All of the employees of the defendant who testified i 
at the time of the trial stated that the company has in its 1 
stock as standard equipment signs which state "Danger· 
High Voltage" or words to that effect and are white with 
a red background. (T. 84, 85, 91) None of these signs 
were placed on the grain bin or on the power line of the 
1 
defendant in the area where the accident occurred. The 
defendant's employees also testified that wires identical 
I 
to the ones which plaintiff came in contact with were 
used to carry from 110 to 44,000 volts and there was no 
way to tell the voltage in the wire simply by looking at it. 
(T. 249) They also concede that the general public knows , 
less what to guard against than experienced power cont· 
pany employees and that the defendant had no measure· 
ments of the distances between the power lines in ques· 
tion and the grain bin until preparing for the trial of the 
case. (T. 258, 261). 
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Defendant's employees further admitted that the 
ladder rungs on the outside of the grain bin facing the 
power line and the access hole at the top were obvious 
to anyone passing the area (T. 2 5 5) and that persons 
would climb the bin in order to enter the same and use 
mechanical grain augers to load and unload the same. 
(T. 256) 
Mr. Smith, the owner of the grain bin where the acci-
dent occurred, testified that prior to the time of this acci-
dent he was only familiar with brass probes which were 
not in sections and were anywhere from six to ten feet in 
length and that it would be very easy in using one of these 
types of probes to come in contact with the defendant's 
power line. (T. 267, 269) Also Galen Christensen, who 
had been engaged in the grain business for twenty-seven 
years, stated that in his opinion, the high voltage line in 
such close proximity to a grain bin would be very hazard-
ous to the operations in loading and unloading the bin 
and in taking samples of the grain. (T. 53, 58, 59) 
The case was submitted to the jury and they returned 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defend-
ant and awarded special damages in the sum of $17 ,-
500.00 and general damages of $32,500.00. The parties 
had informally agreed that the claim of the plaintiff for 
loss of income, past and future, should be treated as an 
item of general damages just prior to the case being sub-
mitted to the jury. (T. 319) However, the instruction con-
cerning general damages did not include the element of 
lost income. (R. 21) 
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After the verdict had been returned, the trial judge 
amended the verdict by deleting the sum of $13,675.56 
from the award for special damages. (T. 319-321) There. 
after, the plaintiff made a motion to reform the verdict 
by adding the sum deleted from the award for special 
damages to the sum awarded for general damages (R. 27) 
which motion was denied by the Court. (R. 28, 30) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT. 
There are numerous cases supporting the general 
proposition of law stated in Point I. and no cases havt 
been found by respondent stating a contrary position. 
There is not only a presumption of validity on appeal 
of the judgment and proceedings in the trial court, but the 
burden is on the appellant affirmatively to demonstrate 
error, and in the absence of such, the judgment must be 
affirmed by the reviewing court. Whitehead v. Adair, 
10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utali 
2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. In addition to being presumed to 
be correct, every reasonable intendment must be indulge~ 
in favor of the judgment of the trial court. Burton t 
Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 24) 
P.2d 514; Nagle v. Club Fontainblue, 17 Utah 2d 12). 
405 P.2d 346; Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation 
17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30. 
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The foregoing proposition is especially true in cases 
which have been submitted to a jury, and the trial court 
has given its approval to the verdict by denying a motion 
for a new trial as is the case here. In this regard the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Gordon v. Provo City, 
15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430, stated as follows: 
"The purpose of the trial is to afford the 
parties a full and fair opportunity to present their 
evidence and contentions and to have the issues 
in dispute between them determined by a jury. 
When this objective has been accomplished, and 
the trial court has given its approval thereto by 
refusing to grant a new trial, the judgment should 
be looked upon with some degree of verity. The 
presumption is in favor of its validity and the 
burden is upon the appellant to show some per-
suasive reason for upsetting it. * * *" (15 Utah 
2d p. 290) 
POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
1e WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
te 
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ir, 
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At the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for both 
plaintiff and defendant made motions for directed ver-
dicts which motions were denied by the court, and the 
case was submitted to the jury. (T. 310, 311) The jury 
was given ample and correct instructions concerning the 
issue of contributory negligence. Instruction No. 9 sets 
forth the general proposition that one negligent party 
may not recover from another negligent party if such 
negligence contributes in any degree to the cause of the 
accident. Instruction No. 10 sets forth the definitions of 
7 
negligence, contributory negligence, ordinary care and 
proximate cause in a correct fashion. In addition to the 
foregoing, Instruction No. 15 given by the Court was re. 
quested by the defendant and provides as follows: 
"The plaintiff must exercise reasonable care for 
his own safety. If you find from the evidence that the 
plaintiff failed, in the exercise of due care, to observe 
the power lines of the defendant, or if you find that 
the plaintiff in the exercise of due care should have ob. 
served the said power lines and avoided the accident and 
that such failure proximately contributed in any de· 
gree to the accident of which plaintiff complains, then 
your verdict must be against the plaintiff, no cause of 
action." 
The content of this instruction was substantially reiterat· 
ed in Instruction No. 18 given by the Court in advising 
the jury that if the plaintiff was found to be contribu· 
torily negligent, a verdict of no cause of action should be 
returned. (R. 21) 
This Court has repeatedly held that the issues of neg· 
ligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the 
party had acted as would a reasonable and prudent per· 
son under the given circumstances. In reiterating this 
proposition, the Supreme Court in the case of Hindmarsh 
v. 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 466 P.2d 410, 
stated as follows: 
"The burden of proving the plaintiff's contributor) 
negligence is upon the defendant. The trial court could 
properly take the issue from the jury and rule that the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of faw 
only if the evidence demonstrated that fact with su~fic· 
ient certainty that all reasonable minds would so ft0d. 
Conversely, if the evidence is such as to permit reason· 
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able minds to differ as to whether the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence, the question is for the 
jury to decide. * * *" (21 Utah 2d p. 415) 
Other cases setting forth the foregoing proposition are 
Sumsion v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 
450 P.2d 399; Grant v. Pelton, 16 Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d 
897; Jensen v. Dolan, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191; and 
Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676, 
In the case of Glen v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 
308, 265 P.2d 1013, the trial court set aside a jury verdict 
for plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and 
reinstated the jury verdict and in addressing itself as to 
the issue of whether or not the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law stated as follows: 
"* * * Too, more than one inference can be here 
drawn as to what reasonably prudent men would 
do under the particular circumstances, which 
makes the question of contributory negligence one 
for the jury. * * *" (1 Utah 2d p. 312) 
The defendant in its brief cites several cases which 
set forth the general proposition that a person may be 
guilty of negligence or contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law if he either looked and failed to see what was 
there to be seen or if he failed to look. Plaintiff does not 
disagree with this rule, however, it is clearly inapplicable 
iry to the fact situation of the instant case. 
ild 
:he 
aw 
'ic· 
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)0' 
In this case, the plaintiff indicated that he was famil-
iar with poles which he described as "telephone poles" 
running along the highway adjacent to the grain bin. 
9 
However, he had no specific knowledge that these were 
high voltage power lines and, in fact, said he thought 
power lines were covered by an insulation material, and 
these lines had no such insulation. In addition, the power 
pole closest to the grain bin is some fifty-six feet away in 
an easterly direction. (See diagram of scene attached as an 
exhibit to R.16) The plaintiff did not observe the wires 
upon entering the grain bin for the purpose of probing 
the same to obtain grain samples or at the time he was 
exiting from the bin when the accident occurred. His testi· 
mony in this regard is as follows: 
"Q. Do you have 20-20 vision? 
A. Yes. I wasn't looking for power lines, I 
was up probing a grain bin. 
* * * * * 
Q. Did you - you didn't make any observa· 
tion to see how close the power line was to the 
grain bin, did you, before you entered? 
A. I had no reason to. 
Q. But you didn't do it, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And when you got to the top of the lad· 
der you didn't make any observation to see the 
power lines behind you, did you? To the north of 
the bin. 
A. No, I had no reason to. 
Q. And when you came up out of the bin 
and looking directly to the north and gradual!) 
swung around to the east and to the southeast once 
again, you made no observation as to the power 
lines did you? 
A. No, I never." (T.186, 188, 189) 
10 
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This Court has held that if the conduct being under-
taken by the plaintiff justifies giving some of his atten-
tion in a direction or to matters other than those from 
which the accident arose, then it cannot be said that he is 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This 
principle is set forth in the Hindmarsh case, supra, as 
follows: 
"We refocus our attention on what we have 
stated above to be the critical and controlling is-
sue in this case: defendant's contention that the 
plaintiff must be held guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. This argument is 
grounded upon this concededly correct proposi-
tion: where there is a danger plainly to be seen, 
and the plaintiff fails to avoid it, it is ordinarily 
ruled that she was negligent either in failing to 
look or in failing to heed. However, this is sub-
ject to the qualification that if there is something 
which justifies plaintiff giving part of her atten-
ton elsewhere so that in the total circumstances it 
can reasonably be believed that she was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law is not 
compelled." (21 Utah 2d p. 416, 417) (Emphasis 
added) 
In the Hindmarsh case, the plaintiff had slipped and fall-
en in the defendant's parking lot on a patch of ice and 
snow and was not watching at all times where her feet 
were being placed due to the fact that she was also ob-
serving the movement of cars in the parking lot. Also in 
Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 113, 380 
P.2d 409, the Court pointed out that a person may not 
be held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
if there are extenuating circumstances which impair the 
11 
ability of the person to see the hazard or if the person is 
justifiably preoccupied in looking in a different direction. 
Defendant cites the case of Hale v. Montana-Dakota 
Utilities Co., 192 F.2d 274 (C.A.8, S.D.) in support of its 
contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. In determining whether or 
not a person injured by coming in contact with an electric 
power line may be held contributorily negligent as matter 
of law, the courts have generally divided the cases into 
categories of those fact situations where the party injured 
had no special knowledge of the dangerous condition and 
those cases where the person injured knew of the specific 
condition faced by him or had been given a specific warn-
ing about the same. In the former fact situation, the 
courts have quite universally held that the question of 
contributory negligence is a matter to be submitted to the 
jury and in the latter type of cases, some courts have held 
that the issue of contributory negligence may be ruled on 
as a matter of law. 
The Hale case, cited by the defendant, is clearly with· 
in the category of the cases involving fact situations 
where the person knew of the danger and is so classified 
in an excellent annotation covering the subject of 69 
A.L.R. 2d 9. This annotation states as follows: 
"In actions against the power company ~or 
injuries due to contact, through a held object, ~1th 
a power wire, whether the victim was contr1bu· 
orily negligent has generally been held to p~esent 
a question for the jury, particularly where 1t ap· 
pears that he did not have knowledge of the W 
cific nature which caused his injury. 
12 
_In some cases the question of contributory 
negligence has been held for the jury without re-
gard to the injured person's knowledge or lack of 
knowledge of danger. * * * 
Where it appears cases of the kind here dealt 
with that the injured person had no special knowl-
edge of electricity, and lacked particular knowl-
edge of the dangerous condition which caused his 
injury, the court generally held the question of his 
contributory negligence is for the jury." (60 A.LR. 
2d at p. 51, 52) 
In the case of Potter v. SAC-Osage Electric Cooper-
ative, Inc., 335 S.W. 2d 192 (Mo., '60), the plaintiff's de-
cedent was killed while adjusting a piece of tin on top of 
a grain storage bin and contacted the defendant's electric 
power line which was approximately six feet above the 
bin. The accident occurred only one day after the deced-
ent's brother had received an electric shock while work-
ing on the bin. The Supreme Court of the State of 
Missouri in affirming the decision of the trial court in 
submitting the issue of contributory negligence stated as 
follows: 
"The evidence was such that a jury reason-
ably could have found that the decedent was guilty 
of negligence which barred plaintiff's recovery. 
The jury could reasonably have found that * * * 
[decedent] failed to exercise ordinary care for his 
own safety commensurate with all the facts and 
circumstances in evidence. We may not say, how-
ever, that reasonable men might not fairly reach 
different conclusions on the evidence viewed most 
favorably from plaintiff's standpoint. We there-
fore may not declare as a matter of law that plain-
tiff's decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. We are of the opinion that the trial court 
properly left that to the jury." 
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POINT III. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE CORRECT AND DID NOT RESULT 
IN ANY PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
Jury Instruction No. 14 which was requested by the 
plaintiff and given by the Court states as follows: 
"You are instructed that a high tension trans· 
mission wire is one of the most dangerous things 
known to man. Not only is the current deadly, but 
the danger is hidden away in an innocent looking 
wire ready at all times to kill or injure anyone who 
touches it or comes near it. For the average citi-
zen, there is no way of knowing whether the wire 
is harmless or lethel until it is too late to do any· 
thing about it. Therefore, a high degree of duty 
is supposed upon one who transmits electricity in 
high tension wires to see that no harm befalls a 
person rightfully in proximity thereto when that 
person is himself guilty of no wrong-doing. In 
other words, the highest degree of care must be 
used to prevent harm from coming to others. 
Failure to comply with this duty by Utah 
Power & Light Company would be negligence." 
The first paragraph of Instruction No. 14 was taken 
directly from the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association. 24 
Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393. In the Brigham case, the 
plaintiff, a ten year old boy, was injured when he came in 
contact with the defendant's high voltage power line 
after the pole supporting the same had fallen. The issues 
of negligence and contributory negligence were submitted 
14 
1e 
to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding the 
defendant guilty of negligence and the plaintiff guilty of 
contributory negligence and that each was a proximate 
cause of the accident. 
Defendant contends that this instruction was erron-
eous and prejudicial upon the basis that some confusion 
may exist as to what duty is owed by a public utility 
company who transmits electric power by the interchang-
ing of the words "high degree" and "highest degree". The 
decision of this Court in the Brigham case uses these words 
synonymously in setting forth the proposition that the 
degree of care required by the defendant in transmitting 
electrical power is greater than the degree of care re-
quired by a person or corporation engaged in activities 
which are not as hazardous. To presuppose that some 
prejudice resulted to the defendant by the synonymous 
use of the words "high degree" and "highest degrel:! is 
without foundation and is at best picayunish. 
Defendant further claims that Instruction No. 14 was 
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant in that it was 
argumentative and constituted comment on the evidence 
which is contrary to the provisions of Rule 51 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
:4 The introductory sentences in Instruction No. 14 
1e clearly do not constitute commenting on the evidence and 
in were properly included in the instruction by the court in 
1e order for the jury to be properly instructed that the stand-
es ard of care required of the defendant was greater than 
~ that of the plaintiff and the reason for this increased 
15 
standard. The transmission of high voltage electrical 
power is a hazardous undertaking and the jury was en. 
titled to be so informed. 
Even if the introductory sentences of Instruction No. 
14 could be considered as argumentative the same were 
not prejudicial and as is pointed out by counsel for de. 
fendant in its brief: 
"* * * The giving of such a charge [argument· 
ative] is not grounds for reversal, unless prejudice 
to the party complaining results." 53 Am. Jur., 
Trial, §552. 
In the instant case, the trial court fully instructed the 
jury on the issues of contributory negligence and negli· 
gence. In Instruction No. 8, the Court clearly pointed out 
that before a recovery could be had by the plaintiff 
against the defendant, there must be actionable negli· 
gence on its part and stated in part as follows: 
"* * * Before there can be a recovery, you must 
find that the action was caused by some actionable 
negligence on the part of the defendant. In your 
consideration of the question of negligence, you 
are limitd to the particular acts of negligence in· 
dicated in these instructions. * * * " 
This instruction was further amplified by Instruction No. 
17 and by the other instructions given by the court. Thii 
court and other courts have quite universally held that the 
instructions are to be read as a whole and should be con· 
sidered together by the jury without any undue emphasii 
being placed on any particular instruction and the jull 
is presumed to have followed this. Cromeenes v. Sa 11 
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Pedro L. A. and Salt Lake Railroad Company, 37 Utah 
475, I 09 Pac. 10; Cope v. Davidson, 30 Ed. 193, 180 p. 
873. 
Defendant cites the case of Ireland v. Mitchell, 359 
P.2d 894 (Ore. '61) in support of its position that Instruc-
tion No. 14 was erroneous and prejudicial upon the 
grounds that it recited the holding of an opinion of this 
Court. A review of the Ireland case clearly indicates that 
it is not error, per se, to quote from the language of a 
statute or an appellate court opinion but that the trial 
court must use its discretion in instructing the jury so that 
they may not be confused or mislead by any legalistic or 
other technical words or phrases in a statute or appellate 
court opinion. In the instant case, the introductory sen-
ences to the first paragraph of Instruction No. 14 were 
not legalistic or technical in nature and as indicated 
above, gave the reasons that a high degree of care is im-
posed upon a public utility company engaged in the busi-
1 ness of transmitting electrical power. 
In addition to the foregoing, the Court clearly indi-
cated that it expressed no opinion as to which party should 
prevail and that the instructions should be considered by 
a whole and that the jurors were not to single out any 
J. single sentence from an instruction and ignore the others. 
These admonitions were contained in Instruction Nos. 27 
ie and 29 which provide as follows: 
"If during this trial the Court has said or done 
anything which has suggested to you that it is in-
clined to favor the claims or positions of either 
111 party, you will not suffer yourselves to be in-
fluenced by any such suggestion. 
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The Court has not intended to express, nor 
to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are. 
or are not, worthy of belief; what facts are, or 
are not, established; nor what inferences should 
be drawn from the evidence, nor which partv 
should prevail. If any expression has seemed t; 
indicate an opinion relating to any of these mat· 
ters, you should disregard it, because you are the 
exclusive judges of the facts." 
"These instructions, though numbered sep· 
arately, are to be considered and construed by you 
as one connected whole. Each instruction should 
be read and understood with reference to and as 
a part of the entire charge and not as though one 
instruction separately was intended to present the 
whole law of the case upon any particular point. 
For that reason you are not to single out any cer· 
tain sentence or any individual point or instruction 
and ignore the others, but you are to consider all 
the instructions, as a whole, and to regard each 
in the light of all the others." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
Instruction No. 13 which was requested by the 
plaintiff and given by the court provides as follows: 
"You are instructed that the State of Idaho 
has adopted National Bureau of Standards Ha~d· 
book 81 entitled Safety Rules for the Installat10~ 
and Maintenance of Electric Supply and Comm11111• 
cation Lines regulating the construction and op~r· 
ation of electric power ines. You are further in· 
structed that Section 234. C. (b) provides in part 
as follows: 
"GUARDING OF SUPPLY CONDUCTORS 
Supply conductors of 300 volts or m~re shal~ b
5
e 
properly guarded by grounded ~ondmt, _b~rri~r · 
or otherwise, under the following conditions. 
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(2) Where such supply conductors are placed 
near enough to windows, verandas, fire escapes, 
or other ordinarily accessible places to be exposed 
to contact by persons. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant violated the regulation 
above which is designed for the safety of the plain-
tiff and other person engaged in similar activities, 
such conduct would be negligence on the part of 
defendant Utah Power and Light Company. 
Defendant's first contention of error in relation to 
Instruction No. 13 is that the trial court refused to in-
clude in this instruction the definition of "guarded" as de-
fined by the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 81. 
A review of the record fails to indicate any request by the 
defendant of an instruction setting forth the definition of 
"guarded" as set forth in the National Bureau of Stand-
ards Handbook 81. (R. 20) 
This court has properly and quite consistently held 
that the failure of a party to request a specific instruction 
precludes him from asserting error on appeal because the 
same was not included in the instructions given to the 
jury. See Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 230 P.2d 
576; Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564; 
and State By and Through Road Commission v. Kendell, 
20 Utah 2d 356, 438 P.2d 178. 
Section 234 C. (b) of the National Bureau of Stand-
ards Handbook 81 upon which Instruction No. 13 was 
based provides as follows: 
(b) GUARDING OF SUPPLY CONDUCTORS 
Supply conductors of 300 volts or more shall be 
properly guarded by grounded conduit, barriers, 
or otherwise, under the following conditions: 
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( 1) Where the clearances set forth in table 4 (rult 
234, C, 4, (a), (1) cannot be obtained. 
(2) Where such supply conductors are placed near 
enough to windows, verandas, fire escapes, or 
other ordinary accessible places, to be exposed to 
contact by persons. 
Note: Supply conductors in grounded metal 
sheathed cable are considered to be guarded with. 
in the meaning of this rule." 
As is noted from the rule, there are two circumstance1 
where supply conductors carrying 300 volts or more shal! 
be properly guarded by grounded conduit, barriers or 
otherwise. The requirement of subparagraph ( 1) is that 
the wire be at least 8. 72 feet from a building, and in thi1 
case, the wire was either 9.01 or 9.77 feet from the near· 
est point on the silo. (T.299) Sub-subparagraph (2) of the 
section upon which Instruction No. 13 was based require1 
supply conductors to be guarded when they are placed 
close enough to "windows, verandas, fire escapes or other 
ordinary accessible places, to be exposed to contact b1 
persons." Quite obviously the permanently affixed metal 
ladder rungs and entrance hole at the top of the grain silo 
constitutes an ordinarily accessible place where a person 
may be exposed to contact by the power line maintained 
by the defendant. 
Defendant further contends that this section impose1 
an unusually harsh burden upon them. However, as the 
note from the section clearly indicates, the supply con· 
ductors could have been guarded within the meaning oi 
the rule by placing them in "grounded metal sheathed 
20 
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cables" which could have been done at little expense. In 
this rgard, the following quotation from 26 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Electricity, Gas & Steam, § 122, appears appropriate: 
"* * * The rule that persons controlling so dan-
gerous and subtle an agency as electricity should 
not be permitted to theorize in regard to its prob-
able effects, or speculate upon the chances of re-
sults affecting human life, is only in accord with 
reason and common sense. The wires must be 
either insulated or placed beyond the danger line 
of contact with persons going where they may rea-
sonably be expected to go. * * * Indeed, in view 
of the danger to human life from the maintenance 
of uninsulated electric lines in a growing business 
section, the factor of the expense of insulating the 
lines deserves little consideration in determining 
negligence of an electric company. * * *" 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Instruction No. 17 which was given by the Court 
provides as follows: 
"Before you can return a verdict in favor of 
the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that each of the following two 
propositions are true: 
PROPOSITION NO. 1: 
That the Defendant was negligent in one or 
more of the following particulars: 
A. In failing to comply with the National 
Bureau of Standards handbook No. 81 relating to 
guarding of supply conductors; or 
B. Failing to warn the public of a hazardous 
condition. 
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PROPOSITION NO. 2: 
That the said negligence of the Defendant, ii 
any, was the proximate cause of the injury. 
. If you find that the two foregoing proposi· 
t10ns are true, you should then consider the issue 
of contributory negligence as later defined in thest 
instructions.'' 
Defendant contends that Proposition No. 1 A. is incorreet 
which proposition has been answered by the precedini 
paragraphs dealing with Instruction No. 13. 
Defendant further asserts It.1srevc.r101v No. 1'1 i1 
erroneous in that there was no evidence introduced 
that they had a duty to give any warning what· 
ever to plaintiff or other persons similarly situated and 
that defendant's requested Instruction No. 20 which seD 
forth the proposition that there is no duty to warn of ao 
obvious danger which was refused by the court shoull 
have been given. 
Instruction No. 12 which was requested by the plain· 
tiff and given by the Court and to which defendant take1 
no exception correctly sets forth the duty of the defend 
ant in relation to the other instructions given by th( 
Court. This instruction provided as follows: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty 01 
the defendant power company in this case to us1 
that degree of care which was warranted by the 
individual circumstances at different location! 
along its high voltage line. In this regard'. the. d~ 
gree of care was increased in areas where 1t ro1gb 
be reasonably anticipated that machinery wo~' 
be working or that persons would be clirob1ni 
structures so as to come near to or possibly in con 
tact with the high voltage line." 
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In addressing itself to the question of what evidence 
needs to be introduced to establish the duty owed by 
the defendant, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 
case of Black v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, 
56 N.J. 63, 265 A.2d 129, stated as follows: 
"Expert testimony if offered might well have 
been received to show that the use or posting of 
warning signs was standard practice in the elec-
trical utility industry. But in our view it was not 
at all necessary. The hazard of life and limb aris-
ing from contact with lethal wires under the evi-
dence in this case was easily comprehended by the 
average juror without expert testimony. The con-
ditions present before and at the time of the mis-
hap and the danger associated with them were per-
fectly apparent and capable of analysis by any 
person of ordinary understanding. We think such 
persons acting in the capacity of jurors and com-
prehending the danger presented by the facts in 
this case, were competent to decide without expert 
testimony whether the duty to exercise care com-
mensurate with the risk involved was satisfied 
when the utility failed to post warning signs on 
or near the poles or on the uninsulated wires them-
selves." 
For other cases supporting this propos1t10n, see Hen-
dersen v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 184 Kan. 691, 239 
P.2d 702; and Elliott v. Black River Electric Co-op, 233 
S.C. 273, 104 S.E. 2d 357. 
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POINT IV. 
THE SUM OF $13,675.56 AWARDED BY THI 
JURY AS SPECIAL DAMAGES SHOULD BE ADDED 
TO THE JUDGMENT. 
A claim for loss of wages in addition to the claim fo: 
medical expenses and general damages was made by th1 
plaintiff in his complaint. (R. 1) During the trial of thi! 
case, there was evidence introduced to the effect that tb1 
plaintiff had lost substantial amounts of income from hi! 
business as a grain buyer during the time that he wru 
convalescing from the injuries he sustained. (T.149-19ii 
The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict ia 
favor of the plaintiff and against defendant was returnee 
awarding $32,500.00 general damages and $17,500.0~ 
special damages. (T.319) 
Prior to the case being submitted to the jury, coun 
sel for both sides had discussed the issue of whether or not 
the claim for lost income should be treated as general or 
special damages in submitting the case to the jury, and it 
was agreed that same should be treated as an item ot 
general damages. (T.321) However, in submitting tbii 
matter to the jury, Instruction No. 19 which set forth tbe 
elements which the jury could consider in awarding gen· 
eral damages does not include the element of loss of io 
come. (R. 21) 
Instruction No. 20 stated that the medical ex· 
penses should be included in any award of special 
damages made, and this instruction was followed by lo· 
struction Nos. 21 and 22 which correctly set forth the 
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elements which the jury could consider in awarding plain-
tiff damages for loss of income, however, there was no in-
dication that these should be included in the award for 
general damages. 
The Court amended the verdict of the jury by delet-
ing the sum of $13,675.56 from the award for special 
damages but did not add the same to the award of general 
damages. (T. 319-321) Thereafter, a motion was made by 
the plaintiff to reform the verdict by adding the sum of 
$13,675.56 to the award of general damages (R. 27) 
which motion was denied by the court. (R. 28, 30) 
It is the plaintiff's contention that the court was cor-
rect in deleting the sum of $13,675.56 from the award on 
special damages made by the jury in accordance with 
agreement of counsel shortly prior to the case being sub-
mitted to the jury. However, this award should have been 
included to the award of general damages made by the 
jury in view of their clear indication that this loss of earn-
ings had been sustained by the plaintiff. 
Although plaintiff is unable to find any Utah case 
law dealing specifically with the question of whether or 
not a claim for loss of income should be considered as an 
item of special damages or as an item of general damages, 
it is treated generally by the trial courts of this state as 
being an item of general damages. However, in view of 
the uncertainty in this regard and the provisions of Rule 
9(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires 
items of special damage to be claimed specifically a claim 
for loss of earnings was inserted in the complaint. The 
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claim for lost earnings was made some time prior to thi 
trial and was alleged to be "in the approximate sum 0 
$7 ,000.00", and the evidence introduced at the time 0 
trial showed lost income of from ten to fifteen thousanr 
dollars as well as the loss of future income due to th1 
permanent and disabling injuries sustained by the plain 
tiff as a result of the accident. 
From the verdict of the jury, it is clear that they in 
tended to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of income. 
past and future, which he had sustained and incorporat~ 
this item in the award of special damages. A fair readini 
of the instructions given by the court indicated that th: 
jury was justified in placing the award for loss of incomt 
in the category of special damages, and this amoun' 
should be added to the judgment which has been entered 
CONCLUSION 
This matter was tried by a fair and impartial jun 
upon instructions which considered together set forth tbt 
contentions of both parties. The verdict and judgment 
entered thereon by the trial court is presumed to be cor· 
rect particularly where, as here, the plaintiff's motion foi 
a new trial was denied. The verdict and judgment shouli 
not be reversed without showing of error which is preju 
dicial to the defendant and the defendant has failed tc 
demonstrate this. 
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th1 The verdict of the jury clearly indicates that they in-
tended to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of income, 
o. past and future, which he had sustained as a result of his 
1nr permanent and disabling injuries, and the sum of $13,-
thi 675.56 should be added to the award of general damages 
1tn rather than merely deleted from the award of special 
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Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. 
]. ANTHONY EYRE, ESQ. 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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